分類彙整: 科技

NSA cyber-attacks on China tens of thousands of times, stealing over 140GB of data

Northwestern Polytechnical University was attacked by the US NSA network attack report (Part 1)

On June 22, 2022, Northwestern Polytechnical University issued a “Public Statement” stating that the school suffered an overseas cyber attack. The Beilin Branch of the Public Security Bureau of Xi’an City, Shaanxi Province immediately issued the “Police Information Bulletin”, confirming that a number of Trojan samples originating from abroad were found in the information network of Northwestern Polytechnical University, and the Xi’an police have officially opened an investigation.

The National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center and 360 Company jointly formed a technical team (hereinafter referred to as the “technical team”), which participated in the technical analysis of the case throughout the process. The technical team has successively extracted a variety of Trojan samples from multiple information systems and Internet terminals of Northwestern Polytechnical University, comprehensively used the existing domestic data resources and analysis methods, and obtained the full support of partners in some countries in Europe and South Asia to fully restore The overall overview, technical characteristics, attack weapons, attack paths and attack sources of the relevant attack events are preliminarily determined, and it is preliminarily determined that the relevant attack activities originated from the “Office of Tailored Access Operation” (hereinafter referred to as the “Special Intrusion Operation”) of the National Security Agency (NSA). TAO).

1. Overview of the attack incident

This investigation found that in recent years, TAO, a subordinate of the US NSA, has carried out tens of thousands of malicious network attacks on network targets in China, and controlled tens of thousands of network devices (network servers, Internet terminals, network switches, telephone switches) , routers, firewalls, etc.), stealing over 140GB of high-value data. TAO continues to expand the scope and scope of cyber attacks by leveraging its cyber attack weapon platform, “zero-day vulnerabilities” (0days) and the network devices it controls, etc. After technical analysis and source tracing, the technical team has now clarified the network attack infrastructure, special weapons and equipment, and techniques and tactics used in the TAO attack activities, restored the attack process and stolen documents, and mastered the information of the US NSA and its subordinate TAO on China. Evidence related to cyber attacks and data theft on the Internet, involving 13 people who directly launched cyber attacks against China in the United States, as well as more than 60 contracts signed by the NSA with U.S. telecom operators to build a cyber attack environment through cover companies. More than 170 documents.

  1. Analysis of attack events

In the cyberattack against Northwestern Polytechnical University, TAO used more than 40 different NSA-specific cyberattack weapons to continuously attack Northwestern Polytechnical University to steal its key network equipment configuration, network management data, operation and maintenance data and other core technologies data. Through forensic analysis, the technical team found that the attacker penetrated more than 1,100 attack links and operated more than 90 instruction sequences inside Northwestern Polytechnical University, and located several stolen network devices from the intruded network equipment. Device configuration files, sniffed network traffic data and passwords, other types of logs and key files, and other key details related to the attack activity. The specific analysis is as follows:

(1) Related network attack infrastructure

In order to cover its attack operations, TAO will conduct a long period of preparation before starting operations, mainly to build anonymized attack infrastructure. TAO used two “zero-day vulnerability” exploiting tools for SunOS operating system it mastered, and selected servers with a lot of network application traffic such as educational institutions and commercial companies in China’s neighboring countries as the attack target; after the attack was successful, the NOPEN Trojan was installed. Program (see related research report for details), which controls a large number of springboards.

TAO has successively used 54 springboards and proxy servers in the cyber-attack against Northwestern Polytechnical University, mainly distributed in 17 countries including Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Poland, Ukraine, etc. 70% of which are located in China’s neighboring countries, such as Japan, Korea etc.

The function of these springboard machines is limited to command relaying, that is, forwarding the springboard commands of the upper level to the target system, and thereby masking the real IP of the NSA launching the network attack. At present, at least four IP addresses of TAO’s control jumper from its access environment (US domestic telecom operator) have been mastered, which are 209.59.36.*, 69.165.54.*, 207.195.240.* and 209.118.143. *. At the same time, in order to further conceal the relationship between the springboard and the proxy server and the NSA, the NSA used the anonymity protection service of the US Register company to anonymize the traceable information such as related domain names, certificates and registrants, which cannot be accessed through public channels. make an inquiry.

Through the correlation analysis of threat intelligence data, the technical team found that the network resources used for the attack platform of Northwestern Polytechnical University involved a total of 5 proxy servers. IP addresses in places like the Netherlands and Colombia, and lease a batch of servers. The two companies are Jackson Smith Consultants and Mueller Diversified Systems. At the same time, the technical team also found that the TAO Infrastructure Technology Office (MIT) staff used the name “Amanda Ramirez” to anonymously purchase a domain name and a generic SSL certificate (ID: e42d3bea0a16111e67ef79f9cc2**). Subsequently, the above-mentioned domain names and certificates were deployed on the US-based man-in-the-middle attack platform “Foxacid” to attack a large number of network targets in China. In particular, TAO has launched multiple rounds of continuous attacks and stealing operations on Chinese information network targets such as Northwestern Polytechnical University.

(2) Related cyber attack weapons

TAO has successively used 41 kinds of NSA’s special network attack weapons and equipment in the network attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University. And during the attack process, TAO will flexibly configure the same cyber weapon according to the target environment. For example, among the cyber weapons used in the cyber attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University, only the backdoor tool “Cunning Heresy” (named by NSA) has 14 different versions. The technical team divided the categories of tools used by TAO in this attack into four categories, including:

1. Vulnerability attack breakthrough weapons TAO relies on such weapons to carry out attack breakthroughs on Northwestern Polytechnical University’s border network equipment, gateway servers, and office intranet hosts. It is also used to attack and control overseas springboards to build an anonymous network as a cover for action. There are 3 types of weapons:

① “Razor” This weapon can carry out remote vulnerability attacks on Solarise systems with X86 and SPARC architectures that open specified RPC services. When attacking, it can automatically detect the open status of the target system services and intelligently select the appropriate version of the exploit code to directly obtain the complete information on the target host. Control. This weapon was used to attack the springboards in Japan, South Korea and other countries, and the controlled springboards were used in the network attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University.

② “Island” This weapon can also implement remote overflow attacks on Solaris systems that have opened specified RPC services, and directly gain complete control over the target host. The difference from “Razor” is that this tool does not have the ability to autonomously detect the opening of the target service, and the user needs to manually configure the target and related parameters. The NSA used this weapon to attack a border server at Northwestern Polytechnical University.

③ “Sour Fox” weapon platform This weapon platform is deployed in Colombia and can be used in combination with the “second date” man-in-the-middle attack weapon. It can intelligently configure vulnerability payloads to conduct remote overflow attacks against mainstream browsers on multiple platforms such as IE, FireFox, Safari, and Android Webkit, and obtain the target system. (see: National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center “National Security Agency (NSA) “Acid Fox” Vulnerability Attack Weapon Platform Technical Analysis Report”). TAO mainly used this weapon platform to intrude the host of the office intranet of Northwestern Polytechnical University.

  1. Persistent control weapons

TAO relies on such weapons to covertly and persistently control the Northwestern Polytechnical University network. The TAO action team can send control commands through encrypted channels to operate such weapons to infiltrate, control, and steal the Northwestern Polytechnical University network. There are 6 types of weapons in this category:

①”Second date” This weapon resides on network edge devices and servers such as gateway servers and border routers for a long time, and can perform precise filtering and automatic hijacking of massive data traffic to achieve man-in-the-middle attack functions. TAO installed the weapon on the border equipment of Northwestern Polytechnical University, hijacked the traffic flowing through the equipment and directed it to the “Sour Fox” platform to carry out the vulnerability attack.

②“NOPEN” This weapon is a remote control Trojan that supports multiple operating systems and different architectures. It can receive commands through encrypted tunnels to perform file management, process management, system command execution and other operations. For details, please refer to: “NOPEN” Remote Control Trojan Analysis Report of the National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center). TAO mainly uses this weapon to implement persistent control over the core business servers and key network equipment inside the Northwestern Polytechnical University network.

③ “Rage Jet” This weapon is a Windows-based remote control Trojan that supports multiple operating systems and different architectures. It can be customized to generate different types of Trojan servers according to the target system environment. The server itself has strong anti-analysis and anti-debugging capabilities. ability. TAO mainly uses this weapon to cooperate with the “Sour Fox” platform to implement persistent control over the personal hosts within the office network of Northwestern Polytechnical University.

④ “Cunning Heresy” This weapon is a lightweight backdoor implantation tool that deletes itself after running. It has the ability to escalate privileges. It persists on the target device and can be started with the system. TAO mainly uses this weapon to achieve permanent residency, so as to establish an encrypted channel to upload the NOPEN Trojan at the right time, and ensure long-term control of the information network of Northwestern Polytechnical University.

⑤ “Stoic surgeon” This weapon is a backdoor for 4 types of operating systems, including Linux, Solaris, JunOS, and FreeBSD. The weapon can run persistently on the target device and hide the specified files, directories, processes, etc. on the target device according to the instructions. TAO mainly uses this weapon to hide the files and processes of the NOPEN Trojan and prevent it from being discovered by monitoring. A technical analysis found that TAO used a total of 12 different versions of the weapon in its cyberattack on Northwestern Polytechnical University.

3. Sniffing secret weapons

TAO relies on such weapons to sniff the account passwords and command line operation records used by Northwestern Polytechnical University staff to operate and maintain the network, and steal sensitive information and operation and maintenance data within the Northwestern Polytechnical University network. There are two types of weapons:

①”Drinking tea” This weapon can reside in a 32-bit or 64-bit Solaris system for a long time, and obtain account passwords exposed by various remote login methods such as ssh, telnet, and rlogin by sniffing inter-process communication. TAO mainly uses this weapon to sniff account passwords, command line operation records, log files, etc. generated by business personnel of Northwestern Polytechnical University when they perform operation and maintenance work, and compress and encrypt them for download by NOPEN Trojan.

② “Operation behind enemy lines” series of weapons This series of weapons is specially designed for the specific business systems of telecom operators. According to the different types of business equipment being charged, “operation behind enemy lines” will be used in conjunction with different analytical tools. TAO used three types of hacking tools against telecom operators, including “Magic School”, “Clown Food” and “Cursed Fire” in the cyber attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University.

  1. Concealed weapons

TAO relies on such weapons to eliminate traces of its behavior within the Northwestern Polytechnical University network, hide and cover up its malicious operations and stealing behaviors, and at the same time provide protection for the above three types of weapons. 1 such weapon has been found:

“Toast Bread”, this weapon can be used to view and modify log files such as utmp, wtmp, lastlog, etc. to remove traces of operations. TAO mainly used this weapon to remove and replace various log files on the alleged Northwestern Polytechnical University’s Internet access device, to hide its malicious behavior. TAO’s cyber attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University used 3 different versions of “toast”.

  1. Attack source tracing

Based on the above technical analysis results and traceability investigations, the technical team preliminarily determined that the cyber attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University was carried out by TAO (code S32) under the Data Reconnaissance Office (code S3) of the Information Intelligence Department (code S) of the National Security Agency (NSA). )department. The department was established in 1998, and its force deployment mainly relies on the encryption centers of the US National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States and Europe. The six crypto centers that have been announced so far are:

1. NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, USA;

2. NSA Hawaii Crypto Center (NSAH), Oahu, Hawaii, USA;

3. NSA Crypto Center Georgia (NSAG), Fort Gordon, Georgia, USA;

4. NSA Crypto Center of Texas (NSAT) in San Antonio, Texas, USA;

5. NSA Coloraroo Crypto Center (NSAC) at Macley Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado, USA;

6. The NSA European Crypto Center (NSAE) at the US military base in Darmstadt, Germany. TAO is a tactical implementation unit of the U.S. government specializing in conducting large-scale cyber attacks on other countries and stealing secrets. It consists of more than 2,000 military and civilian personnel. Its internal institutions include:

The first: Remote Operations Center (ROC, code S321), mainly responsible for operating weapon platforms and tools to enter and control the target system or network.

Second Division: Advanced/Access Network Technology Division (ANT, code S322), responsible for researching related hardware technologies and providing hardware-related technologies and weapons and equipment support for TAO network attack operations.

Third Division: Data Network Technology Division (DNT, code S323), responsible for developing complex computer software tools to support TAO operators in carrying out cyber attack missions.

Fourth Division: Telecommunications Network Technology Division (TNT, code S324), responsible for researching telecommunications-related technologies and providing support for TAO operators to covertly penetrate telecommunications networks.

Fifth Division: Mission Infrastructure Technology Division (MIT, code-named S325), responsible for developing and establishing network infrastructure and security monitoring platforms for building attack action network environments and anonymous networks.

The sixth place: The Access Operations Office (ATO, code S326) is responsible for the backdoor installation of the products to be delivered to the target through the supply chain.

The seventh place: Requirement and Positioning Division (R&T, code S327), receives the tasks of various relevant units, determines the reconnaissance target, and analyzes and evaluates the intelligence value. S32P: Project Planning Integration Office (PPI, code S32P), responsible for overall planning and project management. NWT: Network Warfare Team (NWT), responsible for liaison with the Network Warfare Team.

The US National Security Agency (NSA) attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University is code-named “Stop XXXX” (shotXXXX). The operation is directly commanded by the person in charge of TAO, and MIT (S325) is responsible for building a reconnaissance environment and renting attack resources; R&T (S327) is responsible for determining the attack strategy and intelligence assessment; ANT (S322), DNT (S323), TNT ( S324) is responsible for providing technical support; ROC (S321) is responsible for organizing attack and reconnaissance operations. It can be seen that those directly involved in command and operations mainly include the head of TAO, S321 and S325 units.

The TAO director during the NSA attack on Northwestern Polytechnical University was Robert Edward Joyce. Born on September 13, 1967, this person attended Hannibal High School, graduated from Clarkson University with a bachelor’s degree in 1989, and graduated from Johns Hopkins University with a master’s degree in 1993. He joined the National Security Agency in 1989. He once served as the deputy director of TAO, and served as the director of TAO from 2013 to 2017. Beginning in October 2017 as Acting U.S. Homeland Security Advisor. From April to May 2018, he served as the White House State Security Adviser, and then returned to the NSA as a senior adviser on cybersecurity strategy to the Director of the National Security Agency. He is currently the director of NSA cybersecurity.

4. Summary

Based on the analysis results of the National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center and the joint technical team of 360 Company, this report reveals the truth that the US NSA has long been conducting cyber espionage activities against Chinese information network users and important units, including Northwestern Polytechnical University. The follow-up technical team will also release more technical details of the relevant incident investigation in succession.

这都敢给?白俄罗斯直接送中国核心技术,美国都馋哭了

坚守和平共处原则的中国,在国际上有许多“铁兄弟”。然而,在中国的诸多铁兄弟中,有一个欧洲国家虽曾给过中国一项连美国都馋哭了的核心技术,但却一直以来都非常低调,以至于在互联网上有人都时常忘记了它的存在,而这个国家正是白俄罗斯。

那么,白俄罗斯给予中国的核心技术,究竟是什么?而它又为何要给中国这项核心技术?今天,本期节目就为您讲述:中国低调的“铁兄弟”——白俄罗斯。

(白俄罗斯街头)

白俄罗斯在哪里

白俄罗斯,是一个位于东欧,面积仅为20.76万平方公里的国家,和它的另一个“孪生兄弟”:俄罗斯比邻而居。

白俄罗斯与俄罗斯的最大不同,可能就是白俄罗斯的前面多了一个“白”字。白俄罗斯、俄罗斯、乌克兰这三个东欧国家,同宗同源,都是东欧的斯拉夫人。

(白俄罗斯人)

在一千三百多年前,由东欧斯拉夫人建立的第一个国家:基辅罗斯成立,这也是今天白俄罗斯、俄罗斯和乌克兰三个国家的前身。

在蒙古入侵后,基辅罗斯国家灭亡,基辅罗斯国内其中的一支俄罗斯人北上到今天的明斯克地区,自称“白俄罗斯斯”人,而其中的“白”指的就是纯洁的、未被蒙古人征服的俄罗斯人,而这也成为了今天白俄罗斯国名的由来。

而在苏联成立后,昔日里分道扬镳的白俄罗斯、乌克兰和俄罗斯再次合并为一个联盟国家,团结在了苏联的红色旗帜之下。

1949年10月1日,新中国成立,而苏联则成为了第一个承认新中国政权的国家。因此,作为苏联加盟国的白俄罗斯,也是当时最早一批承认新中国的政权之一。

白俄罗斯的首都明斯克,曾经是苏联在东欧地区最重要的一批工业城市。而在中国一五计划期间,白俄罗斯明斯克内的大批工业也开展了对中国一五计划的支持。

而白俄罗斯的工程师也曾大批抵达中国,传授中国工业科技,这也正是两国缔结友谊的开始。

可惜的是,在1991年苏联的红色大厦轰然倒塌,而白俄罗斯也随之独立。不过,新独立的白俄罗斯并没有忘记和中国的友情。

在苏联解体后的第二年,新成立的白俄罗斯共和国便与中国再度建交,在即将到来的新世纪续写两国人民的情谊。

白俄罗斯,为何要将核心技术转给中国?

而让白俄罗斯在21世纪将自己的核心技术转让给中国的,不止是因为上世纪两国人民早已缔结的深厚友情,更是因为中国在白俄罗斯面临经济危机之际,曾向白俄罗斯伸出援助之手。

1991年,白俄罗斯从苏联独立出来后,继承了苏联丰厚的工业遗产。

据统计,白俄罗斯从苏联继承过来的遗产共有15个研究所和设计局,120多家军工产业,其涉及的汽车、重型轮式车辆、机床和激光技术,均在当时的世界上处于领先地位。

 

这让白俄罗斯共和国在独立之初,便是东欧地区的发达工业强国。

而白俄罗斯选举出的第一任总统,也是白俄的现任总统卢卡申科则坚持苏联的计划经济体制,并在经济上采取“紧收银根,开放物价”的经济策略,使得白俄罗斯在解体之初的经济状况,要明显好于其他苏联加盟国。

(白俄罗斯工厂)

不过,在全球化的经济背景下,没有一个经济体能够成为孤岛。受到俄罗斯等独联体其他国家的经济萧条影响,白俄罗斯在1993年初开始出现了本国卢布短缺的经济问题。

为了保证本国拥有充足的货币源,白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科下令准许白俄罗斯流通俄罗斯的卢布。但是,当时的俄罗斯叶利钦政府因迷信“休克疗法”,准许大量卢布流入国际市场,从而造成了卢布的疯狂贬值。

而采用俄罗斯卢布不久的白俄罗斯,也被牵扯到这场货币贬值的风波当中,白俄罗斯此前保持优势的经济状况急转直下:1994年,白俄罗斯的国民生产总值下降30%,工业生产总值下降40%,全国上下都陷入到了巨大的经济危机之中。

为了度过经济危机,白俄罗斯不得不颁布一系列新的开放本国投资领域的法令,希望通过外资来解决此次本国严重的经济危机,其中包括大批开放白俄罗斯铁路交通以及土地租赁的大量相关文件,并准许外国资本租借白俄土地99年。

然而,当时不少试图投资白俄的西方国家,要么选择手持货币,继续坐视白俄卢布掉价,自己再伺机收割;要么则对白俄的困境冷眼旁观,甚至对这个苏联的加盟国幸灾乐祸,以彰显自己在冷战中的“胜利”。

正在白俄罗斯感到无助之际,是中国向白俄罗斯伸出了援助之手,同白俄罗斯于1992年签署全新的一项拯救白俄罗斯经济危机的贸易协议。

当时的白俄罗斯虽然深陷经济危机之中,但苏联为白俄罗斯留下的工业遗产,让白俄罗斯在世界机床生产、机械零部件加工等领域仍能占据一席之地。

(经济危机时期的白俄罗斯街头)

但是,西方国家却多次对白俄罗斯的工业零部件恶意压价,使得白俄罗斯的机械零部件产品严重滞销。

而与西方国家趁人之危不同的是,中国在此时慷慨解囊,不仅用白俄罗斯可以接受的价格,购买了白俄罗斯的大量工业零部件产品。

还向白俄罗斯以低价出售大批当时白俄罗斯需要的蔬菜、水果以及日用品,弥补了白俄罗斯在轻工业领域的短板,改善了当时白俄人民的生活环境。

随着两国经贸往来的日益频繁和白俄自身的经济恢复,白俄罗斯终于在2000年成功挺过了1993—1994年以来的经济危机,人民生活恢复到正常水平,工人的平均月薪维持到了60美元。

而在2008年国际金融危机爆发时,货币贬值的恐慌再度袭卷白俄罗斯。关键时刻,又是中国伸出援手,帮助白俄罗斯修筑核电站、水电站、铁路机车等一系列工程项目,以工代赈刺激白俄罗斯经济复苏,帮助白俄罗斯的经济第二次获得新生。自此,两国之间缔结的友谊便更加坚固,历久弥新。

白俄罗斯,给予了中国什么核心技术

在白俄罗斯挺过2008年的经济危机之后,白俄罗斯也决定投桃报李,给予中国一项白俄罗斯从苏联那里继承过来的“压舱”核心技术,而这项核心技术,正是白俄罗斯在重工业领域擅长的重型导弹运载车技术。

(中国建国70周年阅兵式)

在庆祝新中国成立70周年的阅兵仪式上,东风-41洲际战略核导弹以全新的面貌呈现在公众的视野面前。这次阅兵仪式不仅让中国国内的军迷大呼过瘾,更让海外的诸多国家对此十分关注。

其中,美国的一些军事媒体就通过这次70周年的阅兵仪式,惊讶地发现:中国似乎掌握了十分关键的“重型导弹运载车技术”。

而俄罗斯军事观察网也发文声称,中国已经从第三国掌握了飞毛腿-B导弹系统,未来可能会对仿制更加重型的车辆,使其为弹道导弹服务。而这意味着,中国未来的弹道导弹技术,将很有可能超越美国。

而俄罗斯军事观察网口中,给予中国这项关键技术的“第三国”,实际上正是白俄罗斯。中国最初掌握并应用于东风-41洲际战略核导弹的重型导弹运载车技术,正源于白俄罗斯的玛斯汽车厂。

该汽车厂早在苏联时期便已成立,主要为苏联和目前的俄罗斯军队生产地面移动装备和导弹武器的承载底盘,尤其是重型军用的越野汽车底盘。

其中,俄罗斯著名的“萨玛尔特”洲际导弹,便采用的也是白俄罗斯玛斯汽车厂生产的地盘。而在历史上,玛斯汽车厂生产的苏联MA3—543汽车,则是当时重型军用越野车地盘技术领域里质量的代名词。

白俄罗斯将这份核心技术,慷慨地赠送中国,对中国究竟意味着什么?就拿萨玛尔特洲际导弹作为实例来说,装配萨玛尔特洲际导弹的车辆最快速度可达到80公里每小时,续航距离也可以达到500公里的距离。

就此来看,我国引入这项核心技术,将增加我国未来洲际导弹部署的灵活性和续航性,扩大核威慑力量的打击范围,从而更够更好地捍卫国际和平,保障本国周边的地缘安全。

而如果我国在这项引进核心技术的基础上,再开发属于自己的重型导弹运载车技术,未来我国的东风系列,能够突破萨玛尔特洲际导弹的记录将成为令人期待的可能。

因此,也难怪有许多国家对白俄罗斯给予我国的这项核心技术感到“分外眼红”。

中白友谊,未来将走向何方

未来的中白友谊,究竟将走向何方?或许,“继往开来”四字,就是对未来中白友谊发展方向的最好概括。

在新冠疫情之初,白俄罗斯也曾多次慷慨解囊,向我国派遣飞机和医疗人员,并为我国提供高达20吨的消毒液、口罩等医疗物资。

尽管白俄罗斯的经济体量对于一些大国而言显得相形见绌,但是白俄罗斯却也尽可能地向我国表达了多年来的兄弟情谊。

同样的,在白俄罗斯深陷疫情之际,我国也在第一时间为白俄罗斯提供了高达500立方米的医疗物资,并为白俄罗斯提供了防护服、红外测温仪、检测试剂、医疗手套等多种物资,缓解白俄罗斯的疫情。

未来的中白友谊,将在继承过去两国人民情谊的基础上,不断拓宽新的合作领域,以达成两国人民的互利共赢。

(中国为白俄罗斯提供的医疗物资)

在新冠疫情之际,我国依旧保持着经济的高速发展,并同白俄保持着高额的贸易往来,这为后疫情时代白俄罗斯的经济复苏和发展提供了新的可能。

而在军工领域,白俄罗斯新近研制的沃拉特V2装甲运输车展现出了卓越的性能,未来两国就装甲运输车领域开展合作,也将对两国人民大有裨益。

今年是中国和白俄罗斯建交的30周年,未来的中国和白俄罗斯,必将继续携手,共同谋求两国人民的发展,为世界的和平与繁荣贡献一份属于自己的力量!

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